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Effective regulation of the fossil fuel industry is a difficult problem, made 
more complicated by the possibility that such regulation may be interpreted 
as a taking under the 5th Amendment. This means that any potential 
regulation of fossil fuel extraction potentially exposes the federal 
government to large financial liability. This Note will demonstrate why John 
Rawls’s Theory of Justice ought to inform the measure of compensation for 
takings. Then it will apply Rawls and the existing takings cases to show that 
the value of fossil fuel deposits for the purposes of compensation for a taking 
should be zero. 
INTRODUCTION 
One of the most pressing public policy concerns in the United States is 
curtailing emissions from fossil fuels. The President-Elect at the time of 
writing, Joe Biden, has an ambitious climate plan that will address 
emissions, among other issues.1 However, one difficulty unaddressed by 
these plan is the potential compensation that the federal government might 
have to pay to owners of fossil fuel deposits and infrastructure, who may 
claim that regulation involved constitutes a regulatory taking.2 The Takings 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment prevents the federal government from 
 
 
* J.D. Candidate, Washington University School of Law, Class of 2021. 
1.  Juliet Eilperin, Dino Grandoni & Darryl Fears, A Biden Victory Positions America for a 
180-Degree Turn on Climate Change, WASH. POST (Nov. 7, 2020, 7:59 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/climateenvironment/2020/11/07/biden-climate-change-monuments/ 
[https://perma.cc/4DGV-LZT9]. Joseph Biden’s climate plan includes measures to “restrict oil and gas 
drilling on public lands and waters; ratchet up federal mileage standards for cars and SUVs; block 
pipelines that transport fossil fuels across the country; provide federal incentives to develop renewable 
power; and mobilize other nations to make deeper cuts in their own carbon emissions” alongside a vow 
to eliminate carbon emissions from the private sector by 2035. Id. While it is unlikely that all of these 
policy proposals will be fully carried out, they are indicative of the urgency that political leadership feels 
towards addressing climate change. 
2.  A regulatory taking is a taking that occurs “when the value or usefulness of private property 
is diminished by a regulatory action that does not involve a physical occupation of the property.” 26 AM. 
JUR. 2D Eminent Domain § 11 (2020). A non-regulatory taking is the classic case of eminent domain, 
where the government takes title to or physically invades private property. For more information, see 
infra text accompanying notes 66–71. 











taking “private property . . . for public use, without just compensation.”3 
The value allegedly lost due to regulatory takings, or even outright takings, 
would be calculated by reference to the fair market value of the assets or 
infrastructure.4 This would be potentially ruinously expensive; the value of 
the fossil fuel sector is enormous, with the United States predicted to 
produce over 11.1  million barrels of crude oil daily in 2021 at an average 
predicted market price of $42.00 per barrel.5 Economist Bård Harstad has 
shown that buying and sitting on fossil fuel deposits is an effective way of 
preventing fossil fuel extraction. If regulators adopt this tactic to fight 
climate change by purchasing fossil fuel-bearing property, the cost to 
taxpayers would be prohibitive due to the high market value of these 
properties.6 
This note will argue that just compensation for both regulatory and non-
regulatory takings of land bearing fossil fuel deposits should not consider 
the market value of the fossil fuels that could be extracted.  Instead, 
landowners should be compensated merely for the value of the land had it 
not been used for fossil fuel extraction. Two different justifications for the 
exclusion of fossil fuel deposits from takings claims will be advanced. First, 
that the value of fossil fuel deposits ought to be reduced by permissible but 
unenacted regulations imposed by the state, such as bans on fossil fuel 
extraction or anti-pollution measures. These reductions should be based on 
externalities created by the extraction, transport, and burning of fossil fuels 
for power generation. After these reductions, the real market value of fossil 
fuels should effectively be zero. Second, that the separable interest in fuel 
deposits is not an interest that ought to inhere in the title to the land in the 
first instance. Using land for fossil fuel extraction is so dangerous that it 
conflicts with the background law of nuisance and the state police power.7 
While fossil fuel deposits may be valued by the market at certain prices, 
this does not account for negative externalities produced by extraction and 
burning. The government should not be forced to compensate individuals 
for the inflated value of fossil fuel deposits merely because it failed to 
adequately regulate their extraction in the past. 8  Additionally, this note will 
 
 
3.  U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
4.   Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934). 
5.  Short Term Energy Outlook, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Oct. 2020), 
https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/pdf/steo_full.pdf [https://perma.cc/3UVT-S7LW].  
6.  Bård Harstad, Buy Coal! A Case for Supply-Side Environmental Policy, 120 J. POL. ECON. 
77, 83 (2012). 
7.  See infra Section IV, text accompanying notes 59–62 for a discussion of the background 
principles of nuisance as articulated in the Lucas decision.  
8.  The market price of fossil fuels continues to soar even as the externalities of anthropogenic 












argue that physical takings and the retention of title to fossil fuel deposits 
by the state is more effective and desirable as a long-term goal than the 
banning or harsh regulation of fossil fuel extraction. If the state holds title, 
backsliding and deregulation of the fossil fuel industry under the influence 
of large corporations and special interest groups is far less likely.9 These 
arguments will be advanced under a Rawlsian theory of justice as fairness, 
which privileges the maximization of liberty for all members of society. 
This Note acknowledges that large losses will be borne by those with a 
reliance interest in the extraction of fossil fuels due to eminent domain or 
regulatory takings, given that large tracts of land will be far less valuable. 
However, the above arguments will demonstrate that this loss is best borne 
by those owning the fossil fuel deposits, rather than saddling the public with 
the losses caused by allowing an industry unable to internalize its 
externalities to function.  
Section I outlines the Rawlsian theory of justice as fairness and its 
advantages in crafting a takings jurisprudence. Section II defines “property” 
and takings under the Fifth Amendment. Section III analyzes the various 
theoretical justifications for compensation in eminent domain. Section IV 
examines the application of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council and 
the justification of permissible but unenacted regulations regarding fossil 
fuel extraction. Section V illustrates the externalities of fossil fuel extraction 
and power generation, while Section VI applies the above arguments and 
explicates why, under the Rawlsian conception of justice, the public ought 
not bear the cost of fossil fuel extraction.  
I. RAWLSIAN THEORY: JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS      
To assess what just compensation should be for a taking, it is first 
necessary to define “justice.” This note adopts a Rawlsian view of justice, 
 
 
factored into the market price of fossil fuels, rendering them an underpriced good. One of the ways in 
which the state can correct for market failures and the failure to internalize externalities is by regulation 
or taxation. However, the United States has historically failed to regulate fossil fuel emissions or 
extractions to the degree necessary to incorporate those externalities. Not only that, but the federal 
government has also engaged in massive direct subsidies for the fossil fuel industry. Thus, the market 
price of fossil fuels is entirely disconnected from what their actual value would be in a functional market. 
See Global Assessment Report on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services, INTERGOVERNMENTAL SCI. 
POL’Y PLATFORM ON BIODIVERSITY & ECOSYSTEM SERVS. (CH. 2.1) 72, 
https://ipbes.net/system/tdf/ipbes_global_assessment_chapter_2_1_drivers_unedited_31may.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/XZE2-Q5KV] (working draft). 
9.  While the reselling these lands to private developers is a real possibility, this Note 
contemplates an administration which is already committed to curtailing fossil fuel extraction. As well, 
the taking of lands would deal a substantial financial blow to fossil fuel producers, potentially reducing 
the parties with the capital and expertise to effectively utilize the land even in the event of a policy 
reversion towards fossil fuel extraction. 











as advanced in his seminal work A Theory of Justice. To Rawls, the purpose 
of a theory of justice is assigning rights and duties, as well as the benefits 
and burdens of social cooperation.10 The theory he advances specifically 
draws upon and attempts to further abstract conceptions of the social 
contract exemplified by the theories of John Locke, Rosseau, and Immaneul 
Kant.11 One of Rawls’s principal aims is to provide a workable moral theory 
that relies on neither intuition nor the concept of utility, which Rawls 
believes is greatly lacking in modern moral philosophy.12 This makes a 
Rawlsian approach particularly valuable in the law, as its aim is to construct 
a system which relies on Kantian social contract theory and produces 
concrete rules.13 A Rawlsian jurisprudence prefers concrete rules, rather 
than ad-hoc determinations of utility or the moral intuition of judicial 
decisionmakers.14 This focus on concrete rules increases legal certainty, 
which is always highly desirable and often difficult to obtain.15 Rawls’s 
theory has a strong history in American jurisprudence; while he only 
published his Theory of Justice in 1971, analogous principles have guided 
American jurists such as Chief Justice Earl Warren and Chief Justice John 
Marshall.16 
Rawls proceeds from the assumption that the first aim of a system of law 
or institution must be Justice.17 If a law or institution is unjust, no matter 
how elegant, traditional, or useful, it must be discarded.18 For this reason, a 
system of laws that violates rights is unacceptable, even if it serves the 
whole of society.19 This reliance on axiomatic and inviolable rights shows 
the fundamentally Kantian roots of Rawls’s theory. While the utilitarian 
outcomes of actions can be considered, it is impermissible to do things that 
are categorically unjust merely to serve the public interest. 
Rawls’s theory also posits that a society organized in service of justice 
will always experience conflict over how the principles of justice ought to 
be determined. While “a society is a cooperative venture for mutual 
 
 
10.  JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 4–5 (rev. ed. 1999) (1971). 
11.  Id. at 10.  
12.  Id. at xvii–xviii. 
13.  Id. 
14.  Id. 
15.  See generally James R. Maxeiner, Legal Certainty: A European Alternative to American 
Legal Indeterminacy?, 15 TUL. J. INT’L & COMPAR. L. 541 (2007). 
16.  See generally Michael Anthony Lawrence, Justice-as-Fairness as Judicial Guiding 
Principle: Remembering John Rawls and the Warren Court, 81 BROOK. L.REV. 673 (2016). 
17.  Rawls describes justice as “the way in which the major social institutions distribute 
fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages from social cooperation.” 
RAWLS, supra note 10, at 6. 
18.  RAWLS, supra note 10, at 3. 












advantage, it is typically marked by a conflict as well as by an identity of 
interests.”20 This conflict results from asymmetrical distribution of the 
benefits of social cooperation; each individual member of a society naturally 
prefers to receive a larger share of any gains from social cooperation.21 The 
purpose of the principles of justice is to find some way to adjudicate 
conflicts between these competing interests and the burdens  associated with 
them.22 Rawls says that in any society, the principles of justice will be an 
object of contention. When determining which principles of justice one 
should adhere to, it is preferable to choose the one that produces the best 
outcomes or has the most desirable consequences.23  
Rawls does state some limitations on his theory of justice. First, his 
theory does not attempt to provide an explanation for non-distributive 
situations, or situations which are not concerned with how resources or 
rights are allocated between two or more parties.24 Second, his theory 
considers only systems that have perfect compliance with law and the orders 
of judges.25 These limitations do not hamper the theory when analyzing 
takings jurisprudence. On the contrary, the takings problem is the perfect 
arena for the application of justice-as-fairness. Ultimately, takings are a 
distribution problem. A takings system determines on whom the burdens of 
a policy regulating or seizing property fall, private citizens or the state. As 
a highly ordered system administered primarily by federal judges bound by 
stare decisis, there is practically 100% compliance with court orders and the 
rules of decision set out by the Supreme Court.  
When determining principles of justice, Rawls relies on the “veil of 
ignorance” as a starting point.26 The “veil of ignorance” is a method of 
determining the morality of an issue. In this method,  a theoretical person 
imagines themself in a position where they do not know their own social 
station, economic status, or other unique characteristics.27 Through this 
thought experiment, a decisionmaker ought to arrive at position-neutral 
principles of justice that would result from a fair bargain.28 From this 
position of ignorance, all members of society would make proposals, 
bargain, and argue over the correct principles to adopt. Rawls argues that 
 
 
20.  Id. at 4.  
21.  Id. 
22.  Id. 
23.  Id. at 6. 
24.  Rawls’s theory is only relevant when considering situations dealing with the 
apportionment and distribution of rights. Id. 
25.  Id. at 8. 
26.  Id. at 10.  
27.  Id. 
28.  Id. 











this original position is likely to result in the creation of a society which 
distributes burdens and benefits fairly and in the interest of justice.29  
Notably, a Rawlsian conception of justice does not rely on utilitarian 
considerations.30 While benefits and costs are weighed, Rawls says that it is 
“not just that some should have less in order that others may prosper.”31 
Under a Rawlsian system, it is permissible  for some individuals to be better 
situated, although not for one person or a group of persons benefit at the 
expense of the good of wider society. Most often, one person or a group of 
persons accumulate more capital due to a policy tradeoff that shifts the 
burden of some societal good from one party to another party that does not 
benefit from the good in question.32 
An important element of the veil of ignorance as a decision-making tool 
is its ability to avoid the advancement of personally advantageous but unjust 
rules that benefit certain individuals. Rawls uses the example of taxes that 
support welfare systems: if making decisions without the veil of ignorance, 
a wealthy person might propose that redistributive policies are unjust, 
knowing that the imposition of these taxes would injure them.33 Parties with 
vested interests would propose irrational policies if there was any chance of 
success in their adoption. The veil of ignorance avoids this problem by 
ensuring that decision makers act as if they did not have knowledge of their 
position, and therefore are forced to consider the fairness of proposed rules 
to all stakeholders.34 
Rawls also assumes that, in the original position, all persons are equal.35 
Equality for Rawls is defined as an equal ability to make proposals and 
argue for their adoption.36 All together, these characteristics of the original 
position behind the veil of ignorance define the “principles of justice as 
those which rational persons concerned to advance their interests would 
consent to as equals when none are known to be advantaged or 
disadvantaged by social and natural contingencies.”37 
 
 
29.  Id. at 12. 
30.  Id. at xvii–xviii. Rawls points out that many of the preeminent modern moral philosophers 
have espoused utilitarian theories, and that his lack of reliance on utilitarianism differentiates his theory 
of justice from these philosophical projects. 
31.  Id. at 13.  
32.  Rawls allows for inequalities if they are to the advantage of the least advantaged members 
of society. In other words, if inequality means that those with less are better off than they would be if 
resources were equally distributed, inequality is acceptable. Id. 
33.  Id. at 17. 
34.  Id.  
35.  Id. 
36.  Id. 












These characteristics make Rawlsian notions of justice especially 
appropriate in the judicial context. Equal protection under the law is an 
abiding ideal of the American judicial system.  Despite imperfect 
implementation, the United States has endeavored to create a justice system 
that uniformly applies the law without regard to distinctions between 
individuals.38 Thus, a Rawlsian notion of justice is a useful tool for crafting 
legal interpretations. If rules are made as if behind the veil of ignorance, 
without regard to judges’ or litigants’ positions, the outcome will maximize 
justice, rather than affording privilege based on owned capital. Rawlsian 
theory is essential to creating a just takings jurisprudence. A potential 
concern about takings is the risk of the state exploiting property owners by 
taking property for public use in order to serve policy objectives at the 
former owners’ expense. A Rawlsian perspective fosters a takings 
jurisprudence that does not force private citizens to bear burdens “that 
rightfully should be borne by the public.”39   
In a Rawlsian takings jurisprudence, the converse would also necessarily 
be true. Behind the veil of ignorance, no rational actor would choose to 
adopt an understanding of the Takings Clause that would allow individuals 
to force the public to bear the cost of an activity which rightfully should be 
borne by the individual. Making such a choice would be irrational, as 
disinterested individuals would hardly consider it a fair bargain to allow a 
small group of individuals to enrich themselves by forcing burdens onto the 
general public.40 Thus, in a situation where not taking private property 
would result in the public bearing a burden that rightfully belongs to a 
private citizen, a taking would be appropriate and justified. A Rawlsian 
takings jurisprudence would not privilege prior ownership, nor would it 
allow individuals to shunt their burdens onto the public merely because they 
have acquired a property right. Instead, the court would determine whether 
compensation is fair and just for the whole of society, including the person 
 
 
38.  As Hamilton put it: “All men have one common original: they participate in one common 
nature, and consequently have one common right. No reason can be assigned why one man should 
exercise any power, or pre-eminence over his fellow creatures more than another; unless they have 
voluntarily vested him with it.” Alexander Hamilton, A Full Vindication of the Measures of the 
Congress, NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-01-02-0054 
[https://perma.cc/XG6U-HFWS]. 
39.  A Rawlsian justification is already partially embedded in takings jurisprudence, seen 
notably in United States v. Armstrong, 364 U.S. 40 (1960). In Armstrong, the court stated, “[t]he Fifth 
Amendment's guarantee that private property shall not be taken for a public use without just 
compensation was designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens 
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.” Id. at 49. See infra text 
accompanying note 64. 
40.  This note assumes the rationality of individuals making choices behind the veil of 
ignorance, as Rawls does. 











whose property is being seized. This is in stark contrast to the current 
takings jurisprudence regarding compensation, which is generally 
concerned with the notion of fairness to the property owner alone, rather 
than to society as a whole.41 
These fairness concerns bear strongly on the choice of compensation in 
the event of a taking. If a seizure of private property by the state is classified 
as a taking, rather than an exercise of the police power, the public must bear 
the burden of compensating the individual from whom the property has been 
taken.42 The state must compensate individuals for takings out of 
government coffers, funded by tax contributions and bond purchases by the 
general public. Thus, if the state measure overcompensates or compensates 
a property holder for value that was created by an unjust situation, the public 
would bear this private burden twice. 
II. WHAT IS TAKEN? 
In order to more fully examine what might be “taken” through eminent 
domain or regulatory action of fossil fuel deposits, it is necessary to briefly 
summarize conceptual severance. Courts have applied “conceptual 
severance” to determine what has been taken by a given regulation. This 
began in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, where the Supreme Court 
recognized an  interest in a support estate that was owned as part of the 
subsurface estate as a constitutionally protected property interest separate 
from ownership of the whole property.43 Conceptual severance interprets a 
property right in a given thing as a “bundle of rights,” an “essentially 
abstract set of legal rights—usually with respect to tangible things.”44 These 
rights are expressed not as relationships between an owner and the thing 
they own, but between the owner and other persons. Others owe duties to 
the owner vis-à-vis the owned object without a reciprocal duty on the part 
of the owner.45 In this conception, it is possible to divide ownership of 
 
 
41.  “[T]he Fifth Amendment's guarantee . . . [is] designed to bar Government from forcing 
some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public 
as a whole.” Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49. 
42.  While the police power provides an alternative means to deal with fossil fuel extraction, 
justifying the widespread seizure of property without compensation would likely be politically 
infeasible. Even the minimal compensation that would be given after discounting the market value of 
fossil fuel extraction interests can make a taking more palatable than a seizure. 
43.  Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922). 
44.  Courtney C. Tedrowe, Conceptual Severance and Takings in the Federal Circuit, 85 
CORNELL L. REV. 586, 590 (2000) (citing RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE 
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 57–62 (1985)). 












something, such as a piece of land, into multiple different property rights. 
Each of these property rights could potentially be taken by regulation.46 
The application of conceptual severance is relevant in this context 
because oil and gas extraction rights could be severed from the interest in 
the property itself and considered a separate, constitutionally protected right 
from the ownership of the land under which they lie. If a regulation removed 
the right to extract fossil fuels from a piece of land, it could be considered a 
taking of a protected property right. Additionally, the “value” of a piece of 
property may extend beyond the value of the land itself, as extraction rights 
for oil and gas may not lie directly underneath the property itself. This is 
because many U.S. states apply the “rule of capture” to oil and gas 
deposits.47 Under the rule of capture, a landowner can acquire title to oil and 
gas extracted on their parcel even if the oil and gas had migrated to their 
land from adjoining parcels.48 Thus, a regulatory taking or exercise of 
eminent domain could potentially require compensation not only for the 
value of the land itself, but also for the value of the right to extract gas and 
oil from adjacent parcels.49  
This note proceeds under the assumption that conceptual severance is 
not only possible, but necessary in order to consider the right to fossil fuel 
extraction. For many tracts of land bearing valuable natural resources, the 
tract’s market value may be almost entirely derived from the rights of 
mineral extraction that the property holder can transfer along with title to 
the land. For example, if there was no right to extract oil from land in North 
Dakota (which is sparsely populated and often contains little in the way of 
alternate economically beneficial uses), the land would be worth far less. In 
this case, the value of the land is almost entirely derived from the right to 
extract fossil fuels from it.  
Additionally, the law already recognizes the ability to sever an interest 
in fossil fuel extraction from the land on which it is contained. Mineral 
leases and licenses for mineral exploration and extraction are very common 
in the United States.50 Moreover, federal law recognizes the ability to 
 
 
46.  Id. at 593. 
47.  58 C.J.S. Mines and Minerals § 180 (2019). 
48.  Id. 
49.  There is an argument that there may be no need to compensate for the value of oil and gas 
extraction rights, as they could be categorized as a species of going concern value, like lost profits in a 
business. The Supreme Court has already rejected arguments for compensation for going concern value 
of businesses except in the case of temporary takings. The archetypal example is Kimball Laundry Co. 
v. United States, 338 U.S. 1 (1949), where the Court required compensation for a laundry owner whose 
property was seized during the Second World War which included the loss of going concern value. Id. 
at 15. However, the value of oil and gas extraction rights may not be best characterized as a going 
concern value.  
 











transfer a “mineral estate” in much the same way as other real property.51 
This is a particularly common arrangement, as many individual landowners 
wish to retain ownership of their land and facilitate extraction on it because 
they do not  have the capital to extract the mineral wealth and benefit from 
it. Much like the support estate in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, the mineral 
estate is a valuable interest independent of the value of the land under which 
it lies. If any estate or interest in real property might rightfully be severed 
from the rest of the estate, a mineral estate is the obvious candidate. Mineral 
extraction rights can be severed from the land above and traded; a purchaser 
may only have interest in the right to extract minerals rather than the land 
under which the minerals lie.  
III. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR COMPENSATION 
To identify the proper measure of compensation for a taking of fossil 
fuels, it is first necessary to examine the theoretical justifications for “just 
compensation” generally. Christopher Serkin identified several 
justifications underlying compensation doctrines.52 The most useful to 
examine here is the impact of permissible but unenacted regulations on the 
value of property.53 As an example, Serkin uses the Court’s belief that 
valuation for the purpose of just compensation for riverside property owners 
landowners on navigable waterways ought not include the value the land 
acquired by virtue of its proximity to a waterway.54 In United States v. 
Rands, the Court reasoned that riverside landowners on “fast lands” (lands 
above the high watermark) had always been subject to the power  granted 
to the federal government by the Commerce Clause to regulate all navigable 
waterways.55  
As Serkin points out, this justification should not be limited to those 
subjects over which the United States has a plenary power.56 In a takings 
jurisprudence centered on this justification, any permissible but unenacted 
 
 
50.  Gas, oil, and other mineral leases. See generally 17 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. 
LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 50:57 (4th ed. 1993). 
51.  Wood v. Comm’r, 274 F.2d 268, 271 (5th Cir. 1960). 
52.  Christopher Serkin, The Meaning of Value: Assessing Just Compensation for Regulatory 
Takings, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 677 (2005). Serkin points out that the choice between compensation 
doctrines is not value neutral. Rather, it is a choice between competing philosophical and political 
conceptions of the purpose of takings doctrines. 
53.  Id. at 692–93. Serkin identifies this justification for compensation as most useful to 
advance a permissive and deferential attitude towards government legislation, as well as to lower 
compensation.  
54.  Id. at 694. See United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 123 (1967). 
55.  See Rands, 389 U.S. at 123.  
56.  Serkin, supra note 52, at 694. The example of a polluting factory is rather fortuitous, 












regulation that is a legitimate exercise of government power must be 
considered when determining proper compensation.57 The takings 
jurisprudence contains another analogous idea: “reasonable investment 
backed expectations.” Since Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of 
New York, one facet of the Supreme Court’s takings analysis is whether or 
not the “investment backed expectations” of a private entity are impaired by 
a governmental action.58 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council 
recognized that “investment backed expectations” must be considered in 
light of the background law of property and nuisance.59 The loss of a use of 
land or property that was contradictory to the background law of the state is 
not compensable, as that right did not properly inhere in the title in the first 
instance.60 Underlying the Lucas decision is the notion that the state does 
not have the obligation to compensate for the loss of property or a use of 
property that it deems to be dangerous to the public. As stated by Justice 
Kennedy: “The use of these properties for what are now expressly 
prohibited purposes was always unlawful, and (subject to other 
constitutional limitations) it was open to the State at any point to make the 
implication of those background principles of nuisance and property law 
explicit.”61 
Lucas and other decisions are consistent with the previously described 
Rawlsian conception of “justice as fairness,” which prescribes that 
compensation should generally be given to property owners.62 This 
prescription, however, would not dictate compensation to property owners 
if the use of their property caused harm or impinged on the liberty of 
others.63 The Court has generally been sympathetic to a Rawlsian notion of 
fairness; in Armstrong v. United States, the Court stated that “[t]he Fifth 
Amendment's guarantee that private property shall not be taken for a public 
use without just compensation was designed to bar Government from 
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and 
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”64 Of course, the Fifth 
 
 
57.  Id. at n.70. Serkin specifically draws on Palazzollo v. Rhode Island, where the court noted 
that “a landowner may not establish a taking before a land-use authority has the opportunity, using its 
own reasonable procedures, to decide and explain the reach of a challenged regulation.” 533 U.S. 606, 
620 (2001). The court recognizes that the scope of a taking, or indeed whether a taking takes place at 
all, depends on the reach of the proposed regulation, and that permissible regulations within the power 
of the government to enact do not constitute a taking.  
58.  438 U.S. 104, 105 (1978). 
59.  505 U.S. 1003, 1004 (1992). 
60.  Id. 
61.  Id. at 1030. 
62.  Kevin J. Lynch, A Fracking Mess: Just Compensation for Regulatory Takings of Oil and 
Gas Property Rights, 43 COLUM. J. ENV’T L. 335, 361 (2018).  
63.  Id. 
64.  Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).  











Amendment is not designed to bar the government from forcing some 
people to bear the cost of a private burden that in all justice and fairness 
should be borne by the individual. 
IV. APPLICATION OF LUCAS AND THE CONCEPT OF PERMISSIBLE BUT NOT 
ENACTED REGULATIONS TO EMINENT DOMAIN 
If there is an analytic distinction between regulatory and physical takings 
cases that would prevent the application of precedent from one category to 
takings of the other category, the above analysis would be more 
complicated. As Lucas, Palazzollo v. Rhode Island, and other cases 
following them are primarily concerned with regulatory takings, rather than 
eminent domain, it could be argued that they are inapplicable to the exercise 
of eminent domain. However, the regulatory takings cases are reasonably 
applicable to actual takings as an evolution of traditional takings, rather than 
some entirely separate process. The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment 
prevents the federal government from taking “private property . . . for public 
use, without just compensation.”65 What specific government actions 
constituted a “taking” of property shifted drastically in 1922, with the 
recognition by Justice Holmes that a Pennsylvania statute forbidding the 
mining of coal causing a subsidence for a human dwelling constituted a 
taking by preventing economically beneficial use of coal.66 This was the 
birth of the “regulatory takings” doctrine, which has continued to the present 
day.  
The same reasoning applied in Lucas is applicable to eminent domain 
and the seizure of fossil fuel and fossil deposits. If it could be shown that 
the exploitation of fossil fuels created a public nuisance or was otherwise 
contrary to background expectations, this would alter the reasonable 
expectations of the property owners. If the right to extraction of fossil fuels 
did not rightfully inhere in the property in the first instance, it would be 
unnecessary to compensate for the loss of extraction opportunities if the 
land is taken for public use.  
While the Court has created an analytical distinction between regulatory 
and physical takings, this dichotomy is theoretically difficult. This 
distinction was articulated by Justice Stevens in Tahoe-Sierra Pres. 
Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency as:  
This longstanding distinction between acquisitions of property for 
public use, on the one hand, and regulations prohibiting private uses, 
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on the other, makes it inappropriate to treat cases involving physical 
takings as controlling precedents for the evaluation of a claim that 
there has been a “regulatory taking,” and vice versa.67 
This distinction, Justice Stevens argues, is born of the fact that, “[t]he first 
category of cases [physical takings] requires courts to apply a clear rule; the 
second [regulatory takings] necessarily entails complex factual assessments 
of the purposes and economic effects of government actions.”68 Stevens 
argues that this distinction has a pragmatic element: should physical and 
regulatory takings be analyzed in the same fashion, there would necessarily 
be compensation springing from almost any land-use regulation or other 
regulatory scheme.69  
Andrea L. Peterson provides a compelling reason to doubt Justice 
Steven’s division of regulatory and physical takings. As she points out, the 
overriding concern of whether compensation is required is “fairness.”70 
Even in physical invasions of property by the government, such as the 
destruction of infected trees in Miller v. Schoene, the Court was willing to 
admit that state police power was a sufficient justification to negate the 
necessity of compensation.71 
Establishing that there is no functional distinction between physical and 
regulatory takings, and therefore showing that precedent from one category 
ought to be applied to another, is important when considering the 
application of eminent domain to fossil fuel deposits. While in theory a 
fossil fuel extraction ban would achieve the same policy goals as physically 
seizing the fossil fuel deposits and preventing extraction, regulation is far 
more vulnerable to changing political whims. Regulations can be a political 
liability, as politicians often disapprove of burdensome regulatory schemes 
administered by the federal government.72 Republican candidates have 
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made large political gains in recent years through repeals and promises of 
reform to the regulatory state.73 The unpopularity of regulations leaves them 
vulnerable to backsliding under an adverse administration or Congress, 
which retains the ability to enact new legislation or repeal old legislation 
should it become inconvenient.  
However, physical seizure of property and mineral rights is more 
durable, and less prone to reversal under a new administration. Should the 
government enact a physical taking and pay compensation, it now holds title 
to the land. While there may be initial litigation to determine the just 
compensation owed to a holder of title, there is unlikely to be any further 
litigation or ability to challenge possession by the state. Once a taking has 
occurred, the only issue for litigants is whether the compensation given by 
the state is sufficient.74 
Furthermore, a taking with compensation more closely maps to a 
Rawlsian notion of fairness. In the event that the state takes title to lands 
bearing fossil fuel deposits and gives some compensation, even if only for 
the value of the land absent the market value of the fossil fuels or the right 
to extract them, the landowner still receives some compensation. As 
demonstrated above, there are good reasons to discount the value of these 
extractive rights from the award of just compensation. Without the fair 
market value, regulations could be passed that nearly entirely prohibit 
extractive activity, with little to no compensation. That land may end up 
entirely valueless without the ability to extract fossil fuels. This could leave 
owners with no buyers for large parcels, out hundreds of thousands or 
millions of dollars. If, however, the state takes title and condemns the land, 
they must still pay the fair market value of the land, irrespective of whether 
there would be a potential buyer. This leaves owners with the most 
compensation they are reasonably entitled to while also forcing the public 
to internalize the costs of rendering a large tract of land entirely 
economically unproductive. The public still must internalize these costs 
even if the actual monetary value is marginal due to the land losing some of 
the value the market would assign to it.  
Once the state owns the land on which the deposit lies, it can 
immediately proceed to enact other development, or implement 
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conservation plans.75 However, if the state decides that the land acquired is 
better used by not developing it at all, it would retain the option to do so.76 
In either scenario, the state would be able to regulate the extraction and 
consumption of fossil fuels, and completely bar it if deemed necessary to 
mitigate climate change. Despite these strong arguments for eminent 
domain, a compensation rule that does not include market value of fossil 
fuel deposits would also be of great use in the regulatory arena and would 
substantially reduce the cost of implementing regulatory bans on fossil fuel 
extraction.   
V. THE EXTERNALITIES OF FOSSIL FUEL EXTRACTION 
Fossil fuel extraction produces significant externalities. When the good 
being produced is fairly priced by accounting for the costs on society 
imposed by its manufacture (or does not produce large negative 
externalities) it would be unjust for the state to take title to it or not to 
compensate for the destruction of an interest in it.77 Such a seizure would 
amount to a looting by the state of private property for the states’ enrichment 
or to serve ancillary policy goals. Although the health effects, economic and 
environmental damage, and destruction of indigenous land enumerated 
below are not an exhaustive list, they are sufficient to show that fossil fuel 
extraction and consumption are dangerous enough that the taking of 
deposits is justified.  
Fossil fuels create horrific health effects. Coal power plants emit 
polluting gasses and aerosols, increasing cancer rates and mortality at a rate 
of 24.5 to 32.6 deaths per terawatt-hour of energy generated.78 The 
economic impact of coal extraction are also staggering; by one estimate 
from the Clean Air Task Force, coal extraction and burning costs the United 
States over $100 billion in healthcare expenses every year.79 Fossil fuels 
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also contribute to anthropogenic climate change, emitting billions of metric 
tons of C02 every year.80 These costs are not borne by sellers of coal; rather, 
they are borne by the public who pay for healthcare. The costs are not 
limited to immediate health impacts, however. 
The 2018 National Climate Assessment, produced by the U.S. Global 
Change Research Program (“USGCRP”), estimates that the cost of 
continued climate change to the U.S. economy could cause damages in the 
hundreds of billions of dollars by the end of the century in lost labor hours 
alone.81 Alongside healthcare costs, labor costs, and the economic damage 
caused by displacement, the economic impact of fossil fuel extraction can 
hardly be overstated. The fossil fuel industry does not internalize these 
externalities when selling fossil fuels; no taxation mechanisms, fines, or 
other public policies exist to ensure that the cost of these harms is borne by 
the corporations that extract them. Many of these companies received 
enormous tax breaks and paid zero federal income tax in 2019.82   
The impacts are, of course, not limited merely to economic damages. 
One of the most severe effects of climate change and fossil fuel extraction 
is the loss of vast amounts of biodiversity.  The mere act of extraction drives 
much of this loss of biodiversity, which often takes place in extremely 
species-rich and biodiverse environments.83 Fossil fuels contribute to a loss 
of over 20% of originally-present biodiversity globally.84Although the 





80.  Chris Mooney & Brady Dennis, In Blow to Climate, Coal Plants Emitted More Than Ever 
in 2018, WASH. POST (Mar. 25, 2018, 7:21 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-
environment/2019/03/26/blow-climate-coal-plants-emitted-more-than-ever/ [https://perma.cc/KZ3U-
YXZD]. 
81.  U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, IMPACTS, RISKS, AND ADAPTATION IN THE 
UNITED STATES: FOURTH NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT, VOLUME II 50 (2018).  
82.  See Matthew Gardner, Steve Wamhoff, Mary Martellotta & Lorena Roque, Corporate Tax 
Avoidance Remains Rampant Under New Tax Law, INST. ON TAX’N & ECON. POL’Y 2–3 (2019), 
https://itep.sfo2.digitaloceanspaces.com/04119-Corporate-Tax-Avoidance-Remains-Rampant-Under-
New-Tax-Law_ITEP.pdf [https://perma.cc/GE8H-L4T6]. For example, Chevron, Kinder Morgan, 
Haliburton, and Occidental Petroleum all had effectively negative tax rates in 2019 despite posting high 
profits.  
83.  See Michael B. J. Harfoot, Derek P. Tittensor, Sarah Knight, Andrew P. Arnell, Simon 
Blyth, Sharon Brooks, Stuart H. M. Butchart, Jon Hutton, Matthew I. Jones, Valerie Kapos, Jӧrn P. W. 
Scharlemann & Neil D. Burgess, Present and Future Biodiversity Risks from Fossil Fuel Exploitation, 
CONSERVATION LETTERS (2018). As summarized in the paper, the majority of fossil fuel extraction 
currently takes place in low-altitude environments and close to shore in the case of marine extraction. 
These environments are much richer in biodiversity than more remote, higher altitude and further off-
shore regions, although low-diversity environments can still have vital ecological roles.  
84.  Global Assessment Report on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services, INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
SCI. POL’Y PLATFORM ON BIODIVERSITY & ECOSYSTEM SERVS. (CH. 2.2) 72, 
https://ipbes.net/system/tdf/ipbes_global_assessment_chapter_2_2_nature_unedited_31may.pdf?file=1












understood, the collapse of large parts of the biosphere due to a loss of 
biodiversity will surely have an impact on the ability of the planet to sustain 
human life in an adequate way.85  
Fossil fuel extraction often takes place on lands which traditionally 
belong to indigenous peoples, resulting in the destruction of indigenous 
communities and ways of life.86 For example, the Trump administration has 
proposed allowing exploitation of lands in southeast Utah which are sacred 
to the Pueblo of Acoma tribe.87 Pipeline infrastructure can be immensely 
disruptive to native communities. The Dakota Access Pipeline is an 
illustration of these deleterious effects; as of January 2018, after only 6 
months in operation, the Dakota Access Pipeline had already leaked over 
five times.88 These leaks, regardless of size, are incredibly impactful on 
native communities, and “damages to tribal natural and cultural resources 
along that pipeline’s pathway are ‘not quantifiable’ and ‘cannot be 
mitigated.’”89 
These negative externalities show that compensation for the taking of 
fossil fuel extraction rights would be principally unjust. The value of a given 
oil field or coal deposit is dependent on the price of that oil or coal. If the 
market price of these commodities is currently so divergent from their true 
value, compensating for the fair market value would not be just 
compensation, as required by the Fifth Amendment. The fair market value 
of a commodity or the right to extract that commodity should not be a 
measure of compensation in any circumstance in which a commodity is 
heavily underpriced. Along with the Rawlsian justifications spelled out 
throughout this note, this argument appeals to the intuition that companies 
should not be able to extract value from the public above the actual value of 
the goods or services provided. When the federal government is already 
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heavily subsidizing an industry, to pay compensation for the loss of value 
to that industry because of government action effectively asks the taxpayer 
to pay for the good twice. When the industry has large externalities, the 
company effectively extracts value from the state at the point of sale due to 
underpricing. They also extract value at the point of production, as health 
effects, environmental effects, and economic damage are shunted onto 
federal or state programs to pay for (or more often not pay for, leaving 
private citizens holding both the state and private industry’s bag).  Lastly, 
they extract value in taxes, as many have effective negative income tax 
rates. One of the purposes of the veil of ignorance as a decision-making tool 
is to prevent exactly the situation above. Fossil fuel executives and owners 
receive a much greater share of the benefits than the attendant duties and 
harms that result from fossil fuel extraction.  This is fundamentally unjust. 
No rational decision maker would choose this system of rights allocation 
without prior knowledge that they were an owner of or extractor of fossil 
fuels.  
VI. RAWLSIAN JUSTICE: WHO SHOULD BEAR THE COST? 
In an eminent domain or regulatory takings case concerning fossil fuels, 
a court decides whether individuals who own the land should internalize the 
costs that burning fossil fuels produces. A decision to exclude the value of 
fossil fuels from the fair market value of the land so regulated, or not to 
compensate for the total destruction of the economically productive use of 
the land in fossil fuel extraction, will necessarily create a large loss for the 
fossil fuel owner. However, under a Rawlsian conception of fairness, the 
cost is most reasonably borne by the owner of the fossil fuel deposit. 
Although the public seemingly benefits from the presence of cheap energy, 
the profit from the industry is massive, and the externalities are enormous. 
Given the already established costs to the public of the fossil fuel industry, 
asking the state to use taxpayer dollars to pay individuals for damaging 
fossil fuel extraction would be unjust. The public is already forced to bear 
the burden of healthcare costs, climate change mitigation, and disaster 
preparation, much of which can be laid at the feet of fossil fuel extraction. 
To allow fossil fuel producers impacted by regulatory takings or eminent 
domain to be compensated for the value of their fossil fuel deposits would 
amount to the public both subsidizing the costs of their destruction and 
paying them for the privilege.  
Those sympathetic to the fossil fuel industry might respond that the 
market clearly demands access to cheap energy, and that fossil fuel 
extraction is mandated by the need of the American economy to access 












courts would be ignoring the needs and desires of the American consumer 
to access cheap energy sources. While the economics of this argument are 
beyond this article, it is worth noting that renewable energy sources are 
rapidly decreasing in cost while increasing in effectiveness and ease of 
use.90 
At the same time, the argument that the economy requires cheap energy 
is a utilitarian, consequentialist argument. Aggregate utility might be higher 
in a world in which fossil fuel extraction continues unabated and 
unregulated due to government fear. However, the public, and especially 
the most marginalized and vulnerable in society, are forced to bear the cost.  
Fifth Amendment jurisprudence as it currently stands is not designed to 
ensure the most economically efficient outcome; rather, by the very 
language of “just” compensation, it is designed to ensure that justice is 
served when and if the state must take private property.91 Concerns about 
under-compensation are most obvious, but the opposite problem of 
overcompensation would itself be unjust for the public.  
Behind the veil of ignorance, individuals would agree to rules that would 
not compensate individuals for fossil fuels seized through the process of 
eminent domain. Absent financial incentives fossil fuel ownership creates, 
it is unlikely that individuals would choose to have society bear the cost of 
compensating property owners for the costs of fossil fuel extraction.  
Instead, the rational actor would consider the fair outcome to be fossil fuel 
owners bearing the loss of losing access to extraction. As extraction and 
consumption are so damaging to the general public and individuals, it would 
be irrational for a person behind the veil of ignorance to prefer it since they 
cannot be confident that they would benefit from it. 
These are not entirely new insights on takings jurisprudence. Indeed, the 
framework laid out by Joseph Sax in his influential 1968 article provides a 
way of organizing different justifications for a takings regime. Sax points 
out that twentieth century property doctrines do not incorporate any concept 
of “public rights,” relying instead on laws of private nuisance to regulate 
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conduct by private actors.92 This leads to situations in which individuals 
with property rights to engage in injurious practices, such as strip mining, 
could be compensated by the courts for any regulatory imposition that 
damaged those rights, irrespective of the fact that the exercise of those 
property rights might be highly injurious to neighboring landowners.93 
Noting that there is always a conflict between various uses, some of which 
impose costs on neighbors or others, Sax argues that it is inappropriate to 
find a taking merely because one property right was curtailed.94 In his view, 
the government need not compensate an individual merely for making a 
policy choice between two competing property rights.95 Sax confines his 
analysis to those cases in which there is a “spillover effect” (externality), 
positing that the externalities to public rights created by some private uses 
of land give rise to justification to curtail them without the payment of any 
compensation.96  
Sax articulates three different types of externalities that originate from 
land. The first are those direct spillover effects that restrict the use of 
neighboring land, such as drainage from a mine, or in the fossil fuel context, 
the disposal of fracking fluid onto neighboring properties.97 The second are 
externalities resulting from the impairment of use of a common that another 
landowner has the right to use, like a stream or the air.98 The third is a use 
of property that affects the health or safety of other property owners or puts 
affirmative obligations on the general public.99 
Each of these categories could be applied to various fossil fuel extraction 
or consumption methods. In Sax’s framework, all these externalities justify 
government taking of property without compensation.100 However, the 
clearest example of externalities created by fossil fuels is the emission of 
greenhouse gases. This type of spillover effect falls squarely in the third 
category, uses that affect the health and safety of other property owners. 
Only considering homeowners, data from the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (“NOAA”) suggest that nearly two million 
homes may be at risk of flooding or entirely underwater by the year 2100 as 
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a result of anthropogenic climate change.101 This would cause catastrophic 
economic damage; an estimated $885 billion in lost homes alone.102 
Regardless of the rights that the owners of fossil deposits have in the 
extraction of assets from their land, the exercise of that right has the 
potential to deprive millions of individuals of rights in their own properties. 
Additionally, there are other impairments on the rights of owners of 
abutting or nearby parcels that fit neatly into Sax’s second category. One of 
the most immediately apparent is the disposal of fracking fluids. An often-
overlooked impairment, however, is spills from pipelines. The Keystone 
pipeline provides a representative example; in 2016, 2017, and 2019, 
multiple large spills endangered rural wetlands and agricultural areas in 
North and South Dakota.103 Pipelines create problems on a large scale; 
because of their extremely large profile and length, the potential rights 
holders who are exposed to potential violations are numerous. Sax uses the 
example of strip mining, which can contaminate land for hundreds of miles 
around the site of the strip mine and destroy the rights of adjacent owners 
in bodies of water or other commons.104 The strip mine example still has 
relevance; most coal is extracted by strip mining, a process with impacts 
ranging from the creation of large  holes to the utter levelling of entire 
mountaintops.105 The impact is felt far from abutting parcels, however; 
mountaintop removal changes in water chemistry, river courses, and the 
livelihood of those dependent on fish and healthy river ecosystems.106  
Sax’s first category of externality is often a result of fossil fuel 
extraction. One of the most vivid examples of this is the devastation caused 
by hydraulic fracturing, or “fracking.” Fracking is a process by which water 
is pumped into a borehole in order to fracture shale or other low-
permeability subsurface petroleum bearing formations, at which point most 
of the water injected ostensibly flows back up the borehole to be 
recaptured.107 However, fracking often causes severe impacts to both 
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adjacent and distant parcels. The story of Stacey Haney, a resident of 
Amityville, Pennsylvania, is a perfect illustration. After a fracking 
company, Range Resources, began operations on her property, she and her 
family suffered several horrific medical maladies and dangers. 108Animals 
began to sicken and die, while she and her children suffered from wounds 
that wouldn’t heal, personality changes, and mouth ulcers, to name some of 
the problems.109 Importantly to Sax’s theory, fracking also interfered with 
the use of her well.110 One of the oldest rights guaranteed to property owners 
is the right to the use of water contained within the boundaries of their 
properties;111 interference with this right constitutes a severe imposition on 
owners of property adjacent to fracking operations. Ms. Haney’s story      
example shows the importance of a Rawlsian conception of justice as 
fairness; fracking might distribute some benefits to a small minority of 
shareholders and other stakeholders and provide marginal benefits to large 
amounts of American consumers in the form of cheap natural gas. However, 
under a Rawlsian system, this tradeoff is unacceptable, as the utilitarian 
considerations of cheap liquid natural gas are overwhelmed by the intrinsic 
rights to water and health of those on adjacent parcels.  
More perniciously, the release of greenhouse gasses due to fossil fuel 
combustion creates a public obligation which the state must then fund. Sax 
uses the example of development in a rural area, requiring police protection, 
as a public obligation created by exercise of a property right.112 This is 
particularly relevant in the context of anthropogenic climate change. Many 
coastal cities in the United States have already implemented or are planning 
to implement seawalls in order to mitigate damage from rising sea levels 
and storm surges.113  The federal, state, and municipal governments have 
affirmative duties to protect their citizens from the harms imposed by 
environmental catastrophes like rising sea level, duties which could cost 
over four hundred billion dollars by 2040.114 Not only does this impose an 
affirmative duty on the state, it also imposes an obligation on the taxpayer 
by burdening  them with the costs created by climate change. Thus, fossil 
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fuel owners are imposing massive costs on society. Under Sax’s conception 
of public rights, should not be entitled to compensation for lost rights in 
fossil fuel extraction.115 Other public obligations are created by fossil fuel 
burning and extraction, which is a dangerous activity that the federal 
government often has to clean up after. In particular, the process of 
decommissioning and cleaning up old wells and extraction sites often falls 
on the Department of the Interior.116 The estimated cost of this cleanup as 
of early 2018 was over six billion dollars, an amount which dwarfs the 
surety bonds that fossil fuel companies are supposed to post before drilling 
operations commence on federal land in order to ensure that there are 
adequate funds for cleanup.117 In this case, fossil fuel companies not only 
created a public obligation to clean up these orphan wells, but also extracted 
value in the form of leases on federal land to extract the oil in the first 
instance.  
In instances such as above, compensation for the seizure of fossil fuel 
extraction rights ought not be given. Doing so would be incongruent with a 
Rawlsian conception of fairness or even intuitive notions of justice. If 
compensation was given, fossil fuel extractors and burners would receive 
both a benefit from the provision of public services to prevent ecological 
disasters, as well as a windfall of compensation if prevented from causing 
the damage in the first instance by virtue of regulation. The only actors that 
would consider a system where holders of a dangerous commodity are 
compensated regardless of its production would be those who already have 
a vested interest in that commodity. Behind the veil of ignorance, it would 
be irrational for any person to support such a compensation scheme. A just 
distribution of the benefits and duties associated with fossil fuel extraction 
would necessarily place the burden of cleanup on fossil fuel companies, and 
ensure that those who had previously owned fossil fuels were are not 
allowed to profit at the public and environments expense. 
This analysis applies to the interests in extraction and ownership of the 
fossil fuel deposits, but not to the land under which they lie. As the interests 
in the fossil fuel deposits and the land they lie under are conceptually 
severable, it is possible to craft a judicial rule in which one interest is 
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compensable and the other, due to the injurious nature of its exercise, is not.  
Thus, by conceptually severing the interest in land from the interest in the 
fossil fuel extraction, the state can condemn the land while paying fair 
market value for the interest in the land itself. This eliminates the need for 
prohibitively expensive and unjust compensation for the rights in fossil fuel 
extraction. One way to frame this rule to avoid any unintended 
consequences for other types of extractive industries would be to craft a 
judicial rule that the effective value of fossil fuels is zero. Both approaches 
have merit; a categorical rule that the confiscation of fossil fuel wealth is 
not a taking because of its noxious nature is clean and easy. However, the 
potential precedent set that the confiscation of rights in potentially noxious 
objects would severely harm judicial certainty, as many other commodities 
and their production processes cause similar harms as the fossil fuel 
industry. On the other hand, the judicial rule that the value of a fossil fuel 
interest is zero makes the inquiry fact specific. Some confiscated assets may 
have a fair value that is well below market value, but still nonzero. The 
choice between the two rules is non-obvious; however, either one is still 
vastly superior to a decision to pay fair market value. 
CONCLUSION 
Developing a takings jurisprudence that accommodates the realities of 
market failures in commodities has always been difficult, as foregrounded 
by the interaction of fossil fuel deposits with eminent domain. A Rawlsian 
theory of justice provides a useful framework to evaluate the justice of a 
takings program. This theory and a close reading of the extant doctrine 
illuminates three major problems with the current paradigm of fair market 
value. First, fair market value compensation causes a windfall to fossil fuel 
extractors and owners, as the extraction of wealth in the form of fair market 
value compensation would result in significantly higher compensation due 
to subsidies given to fossil fuel extractors. From a Rawlsian perspective, 
this makes fair market value an illogical compensation scheme, as no person 
would choose a scheme that rewards a small number of individuals while 
disadvantaging most of society from behind the veil of ignorance. Second, 
the payment of fair market value for fossil fuel extraction rights 
compensates owners for a right that should never have been part of the title, 
under the holding of Lucas. Finally, Sax and other commentators have 
pointed out that the creation of externalities by fossil fuel extraction makes 
the compensation for the taking of the right to extract theoretically fraught.  
The federal courts would likely be reluctant to apply these arguments in 
a fossil fuel takings case, and the legislature and executive are unlikely to 












powerful segment of the American and global economies, and the 
externalities created by them are often diffuse.118 Even in acute instances, 
garnering the political will to challenge the longstanding assumptions of 
takings jurisprudence regarding commodities and their productions may be 
difficult for the legislature and executive.119 However, when considered in 
light of the objective of the Takings Clause, a valuation scheme in which 
fossil fuel deposits are not compensated at fair market value is most 
consistent with precedent and fairness.  
This political sensitivity will not last forever. While the issue of 
regulatory takings or eminent domain for fossil fuel deposits garners fewer 
headlines or policy soundbites from candidates, it is only a matter of time 
until a President or Congress attempts some action that could be construed 
as a taking regarding fossil fuel deposits. Voters and interest groups will 
eventually demand action to address climate change, and the legislature and 
executive will be forced to respond. The constitutional controversy will 
arise; the only question is how the court chooses to respond. Their choice 
will determine whether the vested interests of the fossil fuel industry 
continue to hold the future of our planet hostage, or whether political actors 
will be given the tools to avert certain climate catastrophe.  
 
 
118.   See supra text accompanying notes 78–90. 
119.   See Eilperin, supra note 1, for a small sample of the strife President-Elect Biden’s 
relatively modest policies are causing in Washington. 






172 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW [VOL. 13:1 
 
 
 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol13/iss1/9
